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ARE THE WELFARE LOSSES FROM IMPERFECT 
TARGETING IMPORTANT? 
 
Emmanuel Skoufias and David Coady   ii
ABSTRACT 
We evaluate the size of the welfare losses from using alternative “imperfect” 
welfare indicators as substitutes for the conventionally preferred consumption indicator. 
We find that whereas the undercoverage and leakage welfare indices always suggest 
substantial losses, and the poverty indices suggest substantial losses for the worst 
performing indices, our preferred welfare index based on standard welfare theory 
suggests much smaller welfare losses. We also find that we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the welfare losses associated with using the better performing alternative indicators 
are zero. In the case of our preferred welfare index, this reflects the fact that most of the 
targeting errors, i.e., exclusion and inclusion errors, are highly concentrated around the 
poverty line so that the differences in welfare weights between those receiving and not 
receiving the transfers are insufficient to make a difference to the overall welfare impact. 
Our results appear to be robust to the aversion to inequality assumed, as well as across 
the various welfare indices.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade or more, developing countries have placed much more 
emphasis on targeted programs as part of their overall poverty alleviation strategy (Grosh 
1994). This preference for targeting reflects an increased bias against “universal” 
programs, e.g., food subsidies that, because they are badly targeted, result in substantial 
“leakage” of the poverty budget to nonpoor households (Cornia and Stewart 1995). Poor 
targeting may result in a much smaller impact on the welfare of low-income (poor) 
households. In countries where poverty alleviation budgets, and social expenditures in 
general, are being cut in response to budgetary crises, these concerns tend to be 
magnified. 
In order to efficiently target transfers to households, one needs an observable 
indicator that is highly correlated with program objectives, in this case, household 
welfare (Besley and Kanbur 1993). This paper evaluates the range of indicators that has 
been used in practice or suggested in the literature. As a starting point—and consistent 
with the literature, we take household consumption as our “ideal” indicator of household 
welfare (Ravallion 1992; Deaton 1997; Deaton and Zaidi 1999).
1 This standard is 
perceived in the economics literature as a better indicator of lifetime welfare, i.e., 
“permanent income” or persistent poverty. However, household consumption is also 
                                                 
1 Household consumption captures only one of a number of important dimensions of welfare, namely the 
ability of households to purchase goods through markets. But it is an important dimension that is 
commonly focused on in both policy analysis and the relevant literature. For a more complete welfare 
analysis, one may wish to supplement such information with data on access to public goods that cannot be 
purchased through markets (especially where access is not highly correlated with income or consumption), 
or even with indices of “capability” (Sen 1992).   2
perceived as time-consuming and expensive to measure. Thus, it is not always available 
from household surveys and one is often forced to rely on alternative indicators that can 
be constructed with data that already exist or can be more easily or cheaply collected. 
When evaluating these alternative indicators as targeting variables, one needs to address 
the trade-off between the inevitable targeting errors that will result and the cost savings. 
In this paper, we are concerned with the former.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we briefly discuss the 
range of indicators that we consider in this paper as alternatives to consumption as a 
basis for targeting program benefits. These are motivated by their greater availability, by 
their ease and lower cost of collection, or simply by the fact that they are commonly used 
or suggested for use in the literature or by policymakers. In Section 3, we set out the 
methodology used to evaluate the welfare losses resulting from use of these alternative, 
“imperfect” welfare indicators. Our preferred approach is firmly based within standard 
welfare theory, but we also incorporate other welfare indices that are commonly used in 
the literature, namely, various poverty indices and indices of “undercoverage” and 
“leakage.” The data used to simulate program interventions are based on 4,378 rural and 
9,001 households in Mexico surveyed as part of the 1996 National Survey of Household 
Income and Consumption (ENIGH). Our results are presented in Section 4, while 
Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
 
   3
2. ALTERNATIVE INDICATORS 
In this section, we set out the range of indicators that we will evaluate in 
Section 3. To focus attention, and to relate to a real-life poverty alleviation program, we 
use the design of the main poverty program, the Programa Nacional de Educación, Salud 
y Alimentación (PROGRESA), recently implemented by the Mexican government. This 
program involves cash transfers to households, with the amount of the transfer depending 
on certain demographic characteristics of the household, i.e., the age and gender of each 
child.
 Cash transfer programs similar to PROGRESA, which are conditioned on regular 
school attendance and visits to health centers, are finding much favor in other Latin 
American countries. Examples include the Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF) in 
Honduras, and Red de Protección Social in Nicaragua, the Familias en Acción in 
Colombia, and the Bolsa Alimentacao and Bolsa Escola in Brazil.
2  
We consider a range of alternative indicators that can be used in practice to target 
or select households for participation in the program. The “gold standard” household 
welfare indicator, against which all other indicators are compared, is reported total 
consumption per adult equivalent. Consumption is widely used in the literature reflecting, 
in part, both the theoretical and empirical support for household consumption as a better 
                                                 
2 In reality, receipt of transfers is also conditional on enrollment and attendance of the child at school. 
However, in this paper, we ignore the human capital objectives of the program and focus solely on the 
objective of alleviating “current poverty.” The presence of such “multiple objectives” often lies behind the 
use of transfer rules that are not optimal from a more narrowly defined income perspective of welfare. But 
such transfer schemes may also reflect the recognition of the measurement error present in all indicators as 
well as of social, political, and administrative constraints. In any case, the approach outlined below could 
be very easily extended to include comparisons with such optimal transfer schemes.   4
measure of household welfare over the life cycle, or a better indicator of persistent 
poverty. This reflects the fact that it is thought to be less susceptible to seasonal (or inter-
temporal) variation. It is also thought to be less susceptible to underreporting by 
households. However, consumption data are also more expensive and time-consuming to 
collect, which explains the wider availability of the alternative indicators discussed 
below. In calculating it, we include both food and nonfood expenditures as well as the 
value of food items consumed out of own production.
3 These values are adjusted for 
inflation over the six-month frame of reference for the survey.
4 The measure also 
excludes loans made and durable assets purchased by the household. Since there is no 
regional price deflator available for Mexico, we do not account for cost-of-living 
differences across regions. 
The indicators evaluated are: 
 
1.  Reported expenditures: Very often data on consumption out of own production 
(autoconsumption) are not available, so one has to fall back on this proxy. 
2.  Food share: This is derived as the share of total consumption accounted for by 
various foods. The food share occupies a prominent place in the economic 
literature as an indicator of household welfare (e.g., see Deaton 1997).  
                                                 
3 We have also eliminated extreme values in per-adult equivalent expenditures by dropping values less than 
the 1 percentile and greater than the 99
th percentiles of the distribution. This reduced our rural sample from 
4,466 to 4,378 households and our urban sample from 9,183 to 9,001 households. 
4 Since substantial price variation typically exists between urban and rural areas, we focus on these 
subsamples separately in our empirical analysis presented later. See Hentschel and Lanjouw (1996) and 
Deaton and Zaidi (1999) for more detailed discussion on the construction of an appropriate consumption 
variable.   5
3.  Reported income: Many surveys only collect income, as opposed to consumption, 
data. But the collection of income data has its own problems, including seasonal 
variability and its myriad of sources in developing countries, and especially in 
agriculture. 
4.  Probability of being poor: Policymakers responsible for Mexico’s PROGRESA 
program used the following alternative to reported income. They first constructed 
a binary variable that took the value 1 if the household fell below a certain income 
poverty line. Then discriminant analysis was carried out with this binary variable 
as the dependent variable and variables describing the age and gender 
composition of the household, the level of schooling and occupation of the 
household head, and the housing and asset holdings.
5 The discriminant score was 
then used as the basis for categorizing households as poor and nonpoor, with the 
poor receiving the transfers. Since logit analysis is more widely used in the 
economics literature when dealing with binary variables, we construct a poverty 
indicator using the same procedure as above but using logit and the predicted 
probability of being poor in place of discriminant analysis and the discriminant 
score.
6 
5.  Asset index: Most surveys collect information on the range of assets held by 
households, this reflecting their wealth stock (as opposed to the income flow from 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that PROGRESA actually first applied geographic targeting by identifying marginal 
localities where poor households were more likely to be located. See Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999). 
6 A comparison of the logit versus discriminant analysis  revealed that two methods yielded practically 
identical results in the selection of beneficiary households.   6
that wealth). Arguably, ownership of assets is also more easily verified. Including 
such “assets” as access to public services also gives the index a multidimensional 
flavor. Using principal components analysis, we derive the first principal 
component that allows us to construct an asset index (Sharma 1994). This 
approach essentially determines the weights for a composite index of household 
assets and characteristics. An asset index AI is built for each household denoted 
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where f1 is the scoring or weighting factor for the first of the N variables, Xj1 is the 
jth household’s value for the first variable, and X1 and S1 are the mean and 
standard deviation of the first variable over all households. It should be noted that 
the first principal component explained only 14 percent of the total variance in the 
data. Although we include a very wide range of assets, the absence of information 




All the above welfare indicators are viewed as imperfect proxies for the “ideal” 
consumption indicator. Since these are commonly used or suggested as possibilities in the 
                                                 
7 However, a number of studies have found landholdings to be a poor indicator of welfare (see, for 
example, Ravallion 1989).    7
literature or in policy discussions, and are more widely available, it is important to have 
information on the trade-off in terms of the welfare losses associated with using these 
imperfect indicators in the place of consumption.
8 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
In this section we set out the methodology employed in the paper to evaluate the 
alternative indicators described above. We start by assuming a given poverty-alleviation 
budget that is to be disbursed to “poor” households. Ideally we would like to use 
household consumption information to choose which households are to be classified as 
poor and thus receive the transfer. However, in practice, such information is often not 
available or is deemed too costly to collect, so we need to use another indicator that is 
only imperfectly correlated with household consumption. We can thus view the use of 
these alternative indicators as different (competing) programs and evaluate them 
accordingly. 
In order to motivate the preferred welfare index used in our empirical analysis, we 
first present a very simple model of social welfare maximization by the government. In 
an ideal world with perfect knowledge of the welfare function of each household, the 
objective of the “social planner” may be specified as choosing the size and value of the 
transfer to each household so as to maximize social welfare subject to the constraint that 
                                                 
8 For example, Filmer and Pritchett (1998) conduct a detailed study of the usefulness of an asset-based 
index in place of consumption expenditures.   8
the total amount to be disbursed, i.e., budget available for fighting poverty, is fixed at an 
exogenously determined level B.
9 Specifically, social welfare is specified as a function of 
household welfare, V(p,y), where p is the vector of commodity and factor prices faced by 
the household and y is lump-sum transfers from the government. The Lagrangean 
function for the planner’s problem can thus be written as choosing a set of values y
h for 
each household h so as to  
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where W(.) is the concave social welfare function and l is the Lagrange multiplier 
associated with the budget constraint. This specification is essentially the specification 
for the determination of the optimal cash transfer that maximizes social welfare.
10 As is 
well known, the solution to this optimization problem is determined from the first order 
necessary conditions: 
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which implies 
* l b =
h , for all h, where b
h is the social valuation of extra income to 
household h, the so-called “welfare weight” of household h, and 
* l  is the marginal social 
                                                 
9 In this paper we are not concerned about the source of funds, e.g., taxing the richer households, for the 
budget allocated to poverty alleviation. See Coady and Skoufias (2000) for an example that includes these 
considerations into the model.  
10 The literature on optimal taxation is too large to even mention here. See DrPze and Stern (1987) and the 
references therein for more details.   9
value of budget at the optimum. In other words, at the optimum, the budget must be 
distributed such that the social valuation of income at the margin is constant across all 
households.
11 By summing across all households, the first-order conditions above can be 
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Away from the optimum, b
h will, in general, differ across households. Also, one can 
interpret alternative income vectors dy = {…,dy
h,…} as representing alternative targeting 
schemes (denoted by j) for a given budget and calculate an associated  j l . Therefore,  j l  
will differ across targeting schemes both because the welfare weights b
h differ across 
households and the structure of income transfers dy differs across alternative targeting 
schemes.  
Leaving aside, for the moment, the specification of the welfare weights, we can 
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where h refers to households who receive transfers and the level of transfers is dy
h for 
household h. A program that transfers more of the budget to poor households, i.e., 
                                                 
11 Strictly speaking, this condition must hold only for the poorest households that receive transfers. It will 
hold for all households if the budget is endogenous.   10
households with relatively high b
h, will exhibit a higher dW, and thus will look 
increasingly attractive as an income redistribution mechanism the greater one’s concern 
for the poorest of the poor. As indicated above, one can transform this statistic into a 
more conventional benefit-cost ratio by dividing by the overall poverty budget to get, for 
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which can be interpreted as the marginal social value of a unit of revenue transferred to 
households through the program in question. In our empirical analysis presented below, 
we focus on lj as opposed to dW but, as indicated above, given the assumption of a fixed 
budget, both are equivalent for evaluation purposes.
12 
Our first task then is to evaluate the welfare benefit or impact of each targeting 
scheme. Underlying our objective of poverty alleviation must be the view that extra 
income to low-income (or poor) households is more socially valuable than extra income 
to high-income (or rich) households. Making this view explicit essentially requires the 
specification of a set of “welfare weights,” and we expect this weight to decrease with the 
                                                 
12 Note, however, that we are not comparing alternative programs to an “optimal transfer scheme” as in, for 
example, Chaudhuri and Ravallion (1994). The  l for such a program will obviously be the highest 
attainable, but is hypothetical in so far as other factors, e.g., the existence of multiple objectives, in practice 
determine the structure of benefits. Both Chaudhuri and Ravallion (1994) and Schady (1999) focus on the 
minimum cost of achieving a given poverty impact across a range of transfer schemes, including an optimal 
transfer scheme. In any case, our approach can easily incorporate such a comparison.   11
(initial) consumption level of the household. The welfare weight for each household (b
h) 
can be derived as follows: 
 
e b ) / (
h k h y y =  , 
 
where y refers to consumption (or “permanent income”), h superscript denotes the 
household in question, and k superscript denotes a reference household, which always has 
a weight of unity, e.g., the household just on the poverty line, in which case y
k = z, where 
z is the poverty line).
13 The term e captures one’s “aversion to inequality” of income or 
consumption and determines how the welfare weights vary, i.e., decrease, with household 
income. For example, a value of e = 0 implies no aversion to inequality and all welfare 
weights take the value unity, i.e., extra income to households is viewed as being equally 
socially valuable regardless of initial consumption level. A value of e = 1 implies that if 
household h has twice (half) the income of household k, then its welfare weight is 0.5 
(2.0) as opposed to unity for k. A value of e = 2 similarly implies a welfare weight of 0.25 
(4.0) for h. As e approaches infinity, the impact of the program on the welfare of the 
lowest-income group dominates any evaluation, consistent with a Rawlsian maxi-min 
social welfare perspective where we care only about how the program benefits the 
poorest of the poor. The welfare weights used in our simulations presented below use 
                                                 
13 Which household we use as the reference household to normalize welfare weights is irrelevant to our 
analysis. See, for example, Ahmad and Stern (1991, p. 129) for discussion on the choice of welfare 
weights.   12
initial consumption as their welfare reference and we also evaluate the sensitivity of our 
findings to different sets of welfare weights based on different degrees of aversion to 
inequality of initial consumption, i.e., different values of e. Consistent with the program 
objectives, we consider only values of e > 0.  
Alternatively, one can use conventional poverty measures as a measure of the 
welfare impact, as captured by the FGT indices (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984): 
 















where N is the number of households, y
ih is the per adult equivalent consumption of 
household h, z is the poverty line, q is the number of poor households, and a is the weight 
attached to the severity of household poverty (or the “poverty aversion parameter”). 
When a = 0, the FGT measure collapses to the “poverty headcount index,” i.e., the 
percentage of the population falling below the poverty line. Since this measure tells us 
nothing about how far below the poverty line these households are, it is common to focus 
on a = 1 or a = 2, the “poverty gap index” and “severity of poverty index,” respectively. 
The former captures the average depth of poverty, while the latter attaches a higher 
weight to transfers to households the further they fall below the poverty line (Besley and 
Kanbur 1993; Atkinson 1995; Deaton 1997).   13
The poverty approach can be interpreted within the above framework as attaching 
a welfare weight of zero to everybody above the poverty line (i.e., regardless of distance 
above the poverty line) and also essentially to transfer amounts in excess of the minimum 
required to take a poor household up to the poverty line. The extent to which the welfare 
weights increase as income falls further below the poverty line is determined by the 
parameter a. The headcount index has a number of shortcomings as a welfare index, not 
least the fact that it suggests that resources should be concentrated on those just below the 
poverty line. Values of a ‡ 1 try to address this issue by attaching a greater weight to 
extra income to households the further they fall below the poverty line. However, a 
shortcoming still present in the P(1) and P(2) measures is that they do not differentiate 
between leakage (undercoverage) of the program to households that are just above 
(below) the poverty line and households that that are far above (below) the poverty line. 
Most would subscribe to the view that the social value of income to someone just above 
the poverty line is very close to that for someone just below it. Our specification of 
welfare weights as above takes into consideration this issue. Higher values of the 
parameter e can adequately capture our greater concerns for the poorest of low-income 
households. Using the welfare theoretic approach we essentially use the concept of a 
poverty line solely as the basis of a targeting rule. But, for the sake of completeness, we 
also evaluate the alternative programs (or targeting indicators) from the perspective of 
poverty reduction.   14
Yet another approach commonly found in the literature is that of the extent of 
“leakage” and “undercoverage” associated with a transfer program (Cornia and Stewart 
1995). These concepts are defined as: 
 
Leakage:   The percentage of the total beneficiary population that is wrongly 
classified as poor (i.e., errors of inclusion). 
Undercoverage: The percentage of the poor population wrongly classified as 
nonpoor (i.e., errors of exclusion). 
 
Although these measures have a number of shortcomings (e.g., they ignore how 
the levels of transfers vary across households), we also evaluate the programs from the 
perspective of these measures since they are so commonly presented in the literature.
14  
In our empirical analysis we wish to address the following questions: (1) How 
much do the welfare impacts of the various programs (i.e., based on alternative welfare 
indicators) vary? (2) How sensitive is this variation to the degree, or nature, of our 
aversion to inequality (i.e., different values of e or a)? (3) How different are the results 
across the various welfare indices (i.e., welfare, poverty, and undercoverage/leakage 
indices)? (4) Are the welfare losses identified statistically significantly different from 
zero? (5) What are the features of the various indicators that make them more or less 
                                                 
14 For an interpretation of these concepts within a welfare-theoretic framework, see Coady and Skoufias 
(2001).   15
attractive as targeting devices? (6) How sensitive are our results to the size of the 
program budget or to an urban-rural focus? 
In order to evaluate the performance of the alternative indicators, we classify 
households as being (actually) poor, using our “gold standard” of household consumption 
and a (relative) poverty line drawn at the median of the rural sample (i.e., 50 percent of 
the rural population is assumed to be poor). The welfare weights are also calculated based 
on household per adult equivalent consumption. For each indicator, we then determine 
which households receive the transfers by taking those falling into the bottom 50
th-
percentile according to this indicator. The amount of transfer received is then determined 
by household composition according to the scheme explained in Appendix 1.
15 Using the 
various welfare indices, we then compare the welfare impact of the various programs 
(i.e., alternative indicators) with that which would result from “perfect targeting,” i.e., 
using consumption. 
 
4. SIMULATION RESULTS 
In order to get some feel for the imperfect nature of these alternative welfare 
indicators, we start by constructing a graph that captures both the magnitude of the 
targeting errors associated with each indicator as well as the nature of this error, i.e., 
where in the distribution of consumption these errors manifest themselves. For each 
                                                 
15 As noted earlier, for any set of welfare weights, these transfers are unlikely to be “optimal.” The transfer 
scheme used reflects the multiple objectives of the Mexican PROGRESA program, which “conditions” 
transfers in order to provide incentives for the accumulation of human capital.    16
indicator we classify a household as “poor” if it is classified as a poor household given 
the fixed budget of the program, and as “nonpoor” if it is left out of the program. 
Assuming the same fixed budget, this classification is compared with that suggested by 
our reference indicator, i.e., consumption.
16 We construct a new variable that takes the 
value one when households that are classified as “poor” and “nonpoor” according to 
consumption are classified incorrectly as “nonpoor” and “poor,” respectively, according 
to the alternative indicator (i.e., identifying errors of exclusion and inclusion, 
respectively). Otherwise, this variable takes the value zero. Using nonparametric methods 
we then plot the mean of this variable against the log of reported consumption per adult 
equivalent (Figures 1 and 2). The value on the y-axis can be seen as the “predicted error-
probability” (PEP). The height of the curve captures the extent of the targeting errors 
being made at various points in the distribution. The shape captures where in the 
distribution these errors are being made. For example, a bell-shaped curve concentrated 
around the poverty line indicates that most of the error involves a misclassification of 
households that lies just above and below the poverty line. 
Figure 1 plots the PEP curve associated with reported expenditure that excludes 
consumption out of own production, reported income, and the regression-based poverty 
indicator. From Figure 1 we can see that the most efficient targeting indicator is “reported 
expenditure.” The fact that the curves for reported income and “the probability of being 
 
                                                 






























































































































































































































































































































poor” indicator lie everywhere above that for reported expenditure tells us that not only is 
the proportion of targeting errors greater using the former, but they are also more costly 
from a welfare perspective, since a larger proportion of the poorest households are 
excluded and a larger proportion of the richest are included. Figure 2 plots the PEP curve 
associated with the “probability of being poor” indicator, which had the highest PEP 
curve in Figure 1, against the PEP curve for the asset index and the food share. From 
Figure 2 we can see that the most inefficient targeting indicator is the food share. Notice, 
also, that for the two worst-performing indicators, the probability of misclassifying 
households is highest at a level of consumption slightly higher than (or to the right of) the 
poverty line.  
The preceding insights are reinforced by our undercoverage (U) and leakage (L) 
measures (see Table 1). Using both measures, the worst performers are food share and the 
asset index. For these two targeting indicators, leakage lies in the range of 35.1–41.7 
percent, while undercoverage lies in the range of 21.5–28.9 percent. Even the best 
indicator, reported consumption expenditure, has an undercoverage rate of 9 percent and 
leakage slightly above 15 percent. These levels of mistargeting, especially the latter, are 
suggestive of large welfare losses from not being able to use reported total consumption 
to identify which households receive transfers.
17 
                                                 
17 If one includes that income “wasted” through excessively high levels of transfers, this would be even 
higher.    19
Table 1—Welfare and poverty indices under various targeting/transfer schemes 
Sample: All households in RURAL areas 
Poverty line: 50
th percentile of reported consumption in RURAL areas 
 
(percent difference from value of index using reported consumption) 
 
 
















                 
No transfer (no anti-
poverty program) 






   


































































17.31  22.65 
Targeting based on the 






































21.47  35.11 
Targeting based on the 


























To examine the welfare losses due to inefficient targeting, in Figure 3 we graph 
for selected indices (i.e., l(5), l(2), P(2), the undercoverage rate U, and the leakage rate 
L), the percentage difference from the value of the corresponding index with “perfect” 
targeting. Upon inspection of Figure 3, one can draw the following inferences.  
The preferred welfare indices l(e) suggest very small welfare losses, less than 5 


























income. In particular, using l(5), it appears that the welfare losses from the best 
performer among the alternative indicators are quite low, of the order of less than 1 
percent. Considering the implications of this finding for data collection needs for 
targeting purposes, we conduct further sensitivity tests and discuss our findings below. 
The undercoverage and leakage indices consistently suggest substantially higher 
welfare losses from imperfect targeting relative to the welfare losses suggested by our 
preferred welfare index l(e). For example, when reported expenditures are used as a 
targeting indicator, the undercoverage (U) or leakage (L) welfare indices suggest that the 
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L   21
welfare losses associated with l(2) and l(5) is 1.6 percent and less than 1 percent, 
respectively. This reflects the pattern observed earlier in Figure 1, which showed that, for 
this targeting indicator, the targeting errors were highly concentrated around the poverty 
line. In other words, the mistargeting involves transferring income between households 
with very similar welfare weights even for a very high degree of inequality aversion. 
Given that the undercoverage and leakage indices do not distinguish whether the 
incorrectly excluded or included households were close or far away from the cutoff point, 
it is no surprise that the welfare losses associated with these welfare indices appear to be 
much higher than the welfare losses associated with our preferred welfare indices. 
The severity of poverty index P(2) suggests lower welfare losses due to imperfect 
targeting relative to undercoverage and leakage and higher welfare losses relative to the 
preferred welfare index l(e). Interestingly, the welfare losses suggested by P(2) are 
especially high for the worst performing indicator, i.e., food share, and especially low (or 
practically the same as the low welfare losses suggested by the l(2) welfare index) for 
the best performing indicator, i.e., reported expenditures. Of course, the welfare losses 
suggested by any P(a) will be even higher, ceteris paribus, the larger the transfer to 
households since transfers higher than the poverty gap do not contribute to lowering 
P(a).  
Irrespective of the welfare index used, the ranking of the welfare losses is 
insensitive to the targeting indicator used. For example, using P(2) as an index of welfare 
implies that the lowest welfare losses are associated with the use of reported   22
expenditures. Using reported income yields a higher level of welfare losses than reported 
expenditures, while the probability of being poor yields even higher welfare losses, 
followed by the asset index and the food share. The same general ranking is obtained 
using leakage (L) as a welfare measure or l(2) and l(5). The use of undercoverage (U) as 
a welfare indicator also yields a similar ranking except for the way in which it ranks the 
welfare losses associated with the asset index relative to the probability of being poor.  
In order to examine the extent to which these patterns hold when we use an urban 
sample of households, we have also estimated the welfare indicators of Table 1, using the 
sample of urban households and, as a poverty line, the 25
th percentile of reported 
consumption of urban households (see Appendix 2). As can be easily seen, the same 
patterns observed for the rural sample also hold here. The two best-performing indicators 
are reported expenditures and reported income, and for these two indicators the welfare 
losses in the urban sample are as low as those observed for the same targeting indicators 
in the rural sample. For example, using l(5), the welfare losses are less than 5 percent as 
for the rural sample. Additional sensitivity tests were conducted by focusing on the 
sample of rural households and decreasing the budget used for our simulations to 75 and 
50 percent of that used in the earlier simulations in rural areas. Since the patterns 
observed resembled those in Table 1, we chose not to present them. 
Given our findings that the welfare losses across alternative indicators tend to 
cluster within small ranges for the best (or worst) performers, and since for our preferred 
welfare indices the losses for the best performers appear quite low, we investigated a   23
number of related issues in further detail. Specifically, we examined whether the welfare 
loss associated with each imperfect targeting indicator are statistically different from zero 
for any given welfare index, and whether the answers are sensitive to our aversion to 
inequality. As a means of addressing these questions, we used 1,000 bootstrap samples 
(each sample randomly selected with replacement). For each bootstrap sample, we 
calculated the index value for each targeting indicator and, based on the 1,000 different 
values of the indices, we estimated standard errors for each index. For any given targeting 
indicator, our primary objective is to examine whether the value of the index is 
significantly different from that of the welfare impact achieved using the preferred 
indicator, i.e., reported consumption. 
The mean values of the estimated indices along with their associated standard 
errors are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2. In column 3, we also report the p-
values obtained from formal (two-tailed) t-tests of the null hypothesis that value of the 
index is equal to that using reported consumption. Focusing on l(5), we find that the 
value for this index using reported expenditures is practically identical with the index 
value of the preferred indicator. This implies that the welfare losses associated with using 
expenditures that exclude auto-consumption are not significantly different from zero.
18 
This finding is especially interesting in consideration of the fact that consumption out of 
own production is both prevalent and difficult and expensive to collect in rural areas.  
                                                 
18 It is important to note, however, that any hypothesis test regarding specific values of the indices obtained 
with these two targeting indicators will also have very low power.   24
Table 2—Mean values and standard errors for selected indices with alternative 
targeting indicators, based on 1,000 bootstrap rural samples 
  1  2  3  4 
      Ho: diff = 0 
Targeting indicator  L(5)  Standard Error  Ha: diff > 0  Ha: diff = 0 
         
Reported consumption  59.897  3.097     
Reported expenditure  59.772  3.091  P > t = 0.183  P > t = 0.366 
Reported income  58.334  2.978  P > t = 0.000  P > t = 0.000 
PROGRESA-style logit  57.014  2.991  P > t = 0.000  P > t = 0.000 
Asset index  55.549  2.977  P > t = 0.000  P > t = 0.000 
Food share  47.368  2.725  P > t = 0.000  P > t = 0.000 
         
      Ho: diff = 0 
Targeting indicator  L(2)  Standard Error  Ha: diff > 0  Ha: diff = 0 
         
Reported consumption  3.639  0.090     
Reported expenditure  3.583  0.088  P > t = 0.000  P > t = 0.000 
Reported income  3.443  0.083  P > t = 0.000  P > t = 0.000 
PROGRESA-style logit  3.364  0.084  P > t = 0.000  P > t = 0.000 
Asset index  3.237  0.084  P > t = 0.000  P > t = 0.000 




Comparing the remaining indicators with reported consumption, we find that the 
hypothesis that there are no welfare losses associated with using alternative targeting 
indicators is consistently rejected.
19 This finding suggests that using indicators based on 
income or food share or assets is likely to result in significantly higher welfare losses.
20 
Nevertheless, the better performing indicators, such as reported income and the 
probability of being poor, exhibited welfare losses that were significantly lower than the 
rest of the indicators. 
                                                 
19 Chaudhuri and Ravallion (1994) also find that consumption is not necessarily the best indicator of their 
dynamic concept of “persistent” or “chronic” poverty. 
20 We have also experimented with the share of cereals in total consumption and found that it also performs 
as poorly at the share of food in total consumption.    25
Generally similar results hold when focusing on l(2). One notable difference is 
that using l(2) as a measure of welfare yields that the welfare losses associated with 
using expenditures instead of reported consumption are now significantly higher. Based 
on this evidence we conclude that the degree of aversion to inequality has an impact on 
the welfare losses associated with specific targeting indicators. 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we make an effort at quantifying and comparing the size of the 
welfare losses from using alternative “imperfect” welfare indicators as substitutes for the 
conventionally preferred consumption indicator. We find that the size of the welfare 
losses associated with different indicators varies considerably. Our preferred welfare 
index implies that the losses from the two best targeting indicators (reported expenditures 
and reported income) are very low if not trivial (less than 5 percent). Moreover, the 
welfare losses suggested by our preferred welfare index are always lower than those 
suggested by the poverty, undercoverage, and leakage welfare indices. In contrast, the 
welfare losses suggested by undercoverage and leakage indices are substantially higher, 
while those based on poverty indices are relatively high for the worst performing 
indicator (food share). In the case of our preferred welfare index, this reflects the fact that 
most of the targeting errors (exclusion and inclusion) are highly concentrated around the 
poverty line; thus, the differences in welfare weights between those receiving and not   26
receiving the transfers are insufficient to make much of a difference to the overall welfare 
impact.  
Recognizing that welfare indices are subject to sampling error leads us to 
conclude also that there are significant welfare losses associated with different targeting 
indicators. An asset-based index and the share of food as targeting indicators were found 
to have the highest welfare losses relative to all other targeting indicators examined in 
this paper. Although there may be room for improvement in our construction of a “gold 
standard” consumption indicator, it is not obvious that improvements in this direction 
would overturn the conclusions drawn here. We also find, based on our preferred welfare 
indicator, that whether we reject the hypothesis that there are no welfare losses associated 
with using the better performing alternative indicators, e.g., reported expenditures or 
reported income, depends on the extent of aversion to inequality. It may also be that the 
profile of consumption and other household characteristics are so different across 
countries that these results are country-specific. In future work we hope to test the 
robustness of our conclusions across countries.   27
APPENDIX 1 
Simulating the Impact of the Various Targeting and Transfer Schemes 
THE STRUCTURE OF TRANSFERS 
In this appendix, we describe briefly the main steps we have taken for conducting 
our simulations. We have used the amounts, and age and gender structure of the benefits 
to be similar to that of the PROGRESA program. Specifically, the level of primary school 
benefits received by each potentially participating household is determined as follows: 
 
Primary School benefits at the household level =  
(number of boys and girls of 8 yrs of age) * 60P/month + 
(number of boys and girls of 9 yrs of age) * 70P/month + 
(number of boys and girls of 10 yrs of age) * 90P/month + 
(number of boys and girls of 11 yrs of age) * 120P/month. 
 
The level of secondary school benefits received by each potentially participating 
household is determined as follows: 
 
Secondary school benefits at the household level =  
(number of boys 12-14 yrs of age) * 175P/month + 
(number of girls 12-14 yrs of age) * 185P/month + 
(number of boys 15-16 yrs of age) * 185P/month +   28
(number of girls 15-16 yrs of age) * 205P/month + 
(number of boys 17-18 yrs of age) * 195P/month + 
(number of girls 17-18 yrs of age) * 225P/month. 
 
We then summed the benefits from having all children enrolled either in primary 
and secondary school grades with the fixed allowance of 115P/month given to 
PROGRESA beneficiaries. For households that the total exceeded the maximum of 
695P/month as allowed by PROGRESA, we replaced the benefit that could be received 
by the amount of 695P. 
Finally, we added to the total cash transfer the allowances given to households for 
school utilities of the children, these been equal to the number of children in primary 
school*(135P/12) + number of children enrolled in secondary school*(170/12). The 
school allowances were divided by 12 since these are given on an annual, not monthly, 
frequency. The cash transfer of each household was discounted to July 1994 prices in 
order to make them comparable to the consumption expenditures.  
 
BUDGET SIZE 
We used the 50
th percentile of the reported consumption per adult equivalent as 
the cutoff point below which a household is classified as a beneficiary. Given a cutoff 
line, we then derive the value of the budget used in all of our simulations by giving each 
beneficiary the benefits of the PROGRESA program. The average transfer was 210 pesos 
per adult equivalent in June 1994 prices while the total budget amounted to 52.13 percent   29
of the poverty gap. The poverty gap is defined as the sum (across all poor households) of 
the difference between the poverty line and the per-adult equivalent consumption 
expenditure of the household both multiplied by the number of adult-equivalent units in 
the household.  
 
CLASSIFYING HOUSEHOLDS AS POOR WITH ALTERNATIVE TARGETING 
INDICATORS 
Next we employed the alternative indicators used to classify households 
(discussed in the main paper). Each of these indicators allows us to sort or rank all the 
households in the sample from the lowest to the highest value. Cash transfers are given to 
households beginning with households having the lowest value of the indicator to 
progressively higher values until the budget is exhausted. The households that end up 
receiving program benefits are the poor, while those left out because of the limited 
budget are the nonpoor.  
 
NONPARAMETRIC GRAPHS 
In deriving the nonparametric graphs, we follow the methods used by 
Subramanian and Deaton (1996). The procedure works as follows. At any given point x, 
we calculated a weighted mean of the variable identifying whether a household is 
misclassified or not on the log of reported per-adult equivalent household consumption. 
The weights are chosen to be largest for sample points close to x and to diminish with 
distance from x; they are also set so that, as the sample size increases, the weight given to   30
the immediate neighborhood of x is increased so that, in the limit, only x is represented. 
In our case, we chose an evenly spaced grid of 50 points in the distribution of the 
predicted log per adult equivalent consumption and for each grid x, observation i gets the 





























if  h x x h i £ - £ -  and zero otherwise. The quantity h is a bandwidth that is set so as to 
trade off bias and variance, and that tends to zero with the sample size. We have set the 
bandwidth to the value of 0.5.   31
APPENDIX 2 
Welfare and Poverty Indices Under Various Targeting/Transfer Schemes 
Sample: All households in URBAN areas 
Poverty line: 25
th percentile of reported consumption in URBAN areas 
 
(percent difference from value of index using reported consumption) 
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